Strategic Stability and Hybrid Warfare - India and Pakistan

Today, with conventional war becoming a receding option, we are in an era of hybrid warfare; a diverse and dynamic blend of conventional, low intensity, and cyber operations. Low intensity warfare is being orchestrated through both regular forces and irregulars. Examples include Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and the Iranian sponsoring of Hezbollah against Israel. The prosecution of hybrid warfare through irregulars and non-state actors has gained currency over a period of time. Pakistan, after enacting the role of a front line state and supporting the mujahideen to defeat then Soviet Army in Afghanistan in the 1980s at the behest of the United States, has gone on to master this art.

Strategic stability is a product of deterrence stability, crisis stability and arms race stability in the context of a hostile political relationship between two nations. In the South Asian context, the hostile political relationship stems from the unresolved territorial dispute over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) with an active Line of Control (LoC). The state of strategic stability in South Asia has for long been a cause of concern for the international community. Pakistan’s proxy war against India is now in its third decade despite several peace overtures made by India. Waged primarily by Pakistan’s ‘deep state’ – the Pakistan Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – through terrorist organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the Jaish-e Mohammad (JeM) and the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), it is showing no signs of tapering off. In fact, the unrest in Kashmir Valley in the summer of 2016, terrorist strikes at Udhampur, Gurdaspur, Pathankot and Pampore and the interception of infiltration attempts across the LoC once again indicate an increase in the intensity of the proxy war.

Despite grave provocation, including the terrorist strikes at Mumbai in November 2008, India has shown immense strategic restraint and has limited its counter-insurgency operations on its own side of the LoC in J&K. Another ‘major’ terrorist strike sponsored by the Pakistani ‘deep state’– on a sensitive target, causing large-scale casualties and extensive damage to critical military or civilian infrastructure –is likely to result in Indian military retaliation against the Pakistan Army and its organs with a view to raise the cost of waging a proxy war.

Having repeatedly failed to defeat India in conventional war, the Pakistan Army has pursued the low intensity warfare option, with non-state actors as its strategic asset. It has employed terrorists belonging to various groups to wage proxy war in order to achieve its prime political objective of internationalising the Kashmir issue. As a low cost option, this has also well served the interest of Pakistan’s military to keep the Indian Army engaged in combating terrorism. To inflict casualties of the magnitude of the Uri strike through conventional means would imply launching a major operation with a high risk of own losses.

Thus the proxy war strategy suits the political bosses in Islamabad and the military brass in Rawalpindi. Given its internal turbulence, Pakistan is likely to continue to pursue this policy, may be even more proactively in future, unless India takes effective counter measures to thwart Islamabad’s grand design.

So what are India’s options? To start with, policy makers have to formulate a well-defined security strategy to defeat Pakistan’s proxy war strategy. India’s response ought to be at both strategic and operational levels. The strategic dimensions have to be driven through politico- diplomatic means, complemented by Comprehensive National Power, including both hard and soft power to bring requisite pressure to bear on Islamabad to mend its ways.

With regard to the operational aspects, it should be best left to the field commanders. There are a number of tactical options, including local punitive actions, surgical operations, upping the ante along the Line of Control (LoC), and precision air strikes against the terrorist infrastructure, to name a few. At the same time, the counter infiltration posture along the LoC and the counter insurgency grid in the hinterland must be continuously reviewed and perfected. The security of vulnerable areas which have been repeatedly targeted needs to be revamped. There is an urgent need for force restructuring and modernization to enhance the operational efficiency of the armed forces, thus enabling them to undertake multiple missions across the spectrum.

Besides, it is imperative that operational actions be in sync and aligned with the strategic direction to achieve the desired results. Further, there is a need for coordination between various internal security agencies and the armed forces to ensure seamless synergy. The roles of the two sets of forces need to be clearly defined. This remains a major lacuna due to narrow vested organizational interests and turf battles.

India is being perceived as an emerging regional power and a key player in the new world order. To be a deserving claimant for a seat at the top table, India needs to project itself as a responsible and resilient nation that is capable of not only safeguarding its own security but also serve as a stabilizing factor in the region at large. Pakistan cannot be allowed to get away with its nefarious designs. Through a pragmatic strategy coupled with national will, India should undertake calibrated responses to defeat Pakistan’s proxy war game plan with a view to making its misadventures prohibitively costly and unsustainable.

By: Abhishek Sharma