Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology. The regime was formed in 1987 by the G-7 industrialized countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the United States). The MTCR was initiated by like-minded countries to address the increasing proliferation of nuclear weapons by addressing the most destabilizing delivery system for such weapons. In 1992, the MTCR’s original focus on missiles for nuclear weapons delivery was extended to a focus on the proliferation of missiles for the delivery of all types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), i.e., nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Such proliferation has been identified as a threat to international peace and security. One way to counter this threat is to maintain vigilance over the transfer of missile equipment, material, and related technologies usable for systems capable of delivering WMD.
The MTCR is not a treaty and does not impose any legally binding obligations on Partners (members). Rather, it is an informal political understanding among states that seek to limit the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.
The MTCR seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned aircraft) for such weapons. In this context, the Regime places particular focus on rockets and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km and on equipment, software, and technology for such systems.
While there is no formal linkage, the activities of the MTCR are consistent with the UN’s non-proliferation and export control efforts. For example, applying the MTCR Guidelines and Annex on a national basis helps countries to meet their export control obligations under UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

How to achieve objective of MTCR:
Export Controls: The Regime rests on adherence to common export policy applied to an integral common list of items.
Meetings MTCR Partners regularly exchange information about relevant missile non-proliferation issues in the context of the Regime’s overall aims.
Dialogue and Outreach: The MTCR Chair and MTCR Partners undertake outreach activities to non-Partners in order to keep them informed about the group's activities and to provide practical assistance regarding efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD delivery systems.

Category I and Category II Items
Category I items include complete rocket and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles, sounding rockets, cruise missiles, target drones, and reconnaissance drones), capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km, their major complete subsystems (such as rocket stages, engines, guidance sets, and re-entry vehicles), and related software and technology, as well as specially designed production facilities for these items. Pursuant to the MTCR Guidelines, exports of Category I items are subject to an unconditional strong presumption of denial regardless of the purpose of the export and are licensed for export only on rare occasions. Additionally, exports of production facilities for Category I items are prohibited absolutely.
Category II items include other less-sensitive and dual-use missile related components, as well as other complete missile systems capable of a range of at least 300 km, regardless of payload. Their export is subject to licensing requirements taking into consideration the non-proliferation factors specified in the MTCR Guidelines. Exports judged by the exporting country to be intended for use in WMD delivery are to be subjected to a strong presumption of denial.

Members:
There are currently 34 countries that are members (Partners) of the MTCR: Argentina (1993); Australia (1990); Austria (1991); Belgium (1990); Brazil (1995); Bulgaria (2004); Canada (1987); Czech Republic (1998); Denmark (1990); Finland (1991); France (1987); Germany (1987); Greece 1992); Hungary (1993); Iceland (1993); Ireland (1992); Italy (1987); Japan (1987); Luxemburg (1990); Netherlands (1990); New Zealand (1991); Norway (1990); Poland (1998); Portugal (1992); Republic of Korea (2001); Russian Federation (1995); South Africa (1995); Spain (1990); Sweden (1991); Switzerland (1992); Turkey (1997); Ukraine (1998); United Kingdom (1987); United States of America (1987).

Achievements

• The regime has been reasonably successful in streamlining and coordinating the relevant policies of the Group of Seven (G-7) and other Western countries.
• It has helped establish common ground for preventing the export of complete missiles or missile components that could provide the recipient country with ballistic missiles capable of delivering a first-generation nuclear weapon.
• Before the MTCR began, several countries, including Argentina , Iraq , Israel , Libya , and South Korea , had acquired either missiles or missile technology, mostly from the G-7 and other Western nations, which gave them the capability to deliver nuclear weapons. Such possibilities have now decreased
• Following concerns that several non-MTCR countries were working on chemical and biological weapons as an alternative or in addition to nuclear weapons, the regime was extended in 1993 to cover not only ballistic missiles and technology capable of delivering nuclear weapons but also chemical and biological weapons

Challenges

• Although the regime has been fairly successful in establishing policies, it has been less so in putting these policies into practice among its members. Indeed, some of the notable violators of the MTCR guidelines have been entities from within the original MTCR member states.
• As MTCR is a voluntary arrangement, it does not have the ability to sanction member states that violate its guidelines.
• Membership of MTCR was first time expanded during 1990 beginning, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, it was relatively smooth and uncontroversial, but the inclusion of Russia in and Ukraine was problematic. Predictably, several disputes arose over Russia 's missile exports, some of which were seen as contravening the guidelines. Similarly, when Ukraine joined the MTCR, it reserved the right to produce missiles, which went against the spirit of the MTCR. Non uniformity in application dilutes an objective for which it was created
• It lacks the required regulatory framework to check the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Pakistan, India, Iran and North Korea have successfully advanced their missile programmes with foreign assistance.
• Many other countries that are not MTCR members have remained involved in selling sensitive missile technology to other members.
• Not only State even non state actor have acquired missile technology.
• MTCR regime focused only on horizontal proliferation of ballistic missiles among other states rather than vertical proliferation in terms of quantitative and qualitative modernization of missiles by countries already in possession of ballistic missile technology.
   

MTCR And India
India’s efforts to become a member of the MTCR began after the Indo-US nuclear deal in 2008. New Delhi has been keen to become a member of the four export control regimes — MTCR, NSG, Australia Group and Wassenaar Arrangement. But with the nuclear deal stuck over liability issues, New Delhi’s bid to become a member of MTCR only gained momentum from April 2015, after the liability issue was resolved and the US lent its full support.
The government made its case last year, but Italy raised objections in the 34-member grouping — membership is decided by consensus (like NSG) — since it was upset with India over the Italian marines dispute. With both the marines being allowed to return to their country, Rome has dropped its objections.
India’s application was thus admitted and there were no objections from any MTCR member under the “silent procedure”. According to the “silent procedure”, a 10-day period is given by the chair for raising objections. If there are no objections, the new member can be admitted.
Admission to MTCR will open the way for India to buy high-end missile technology, also making more realistic its aspiration to buy surveillance drones such as the Predator, made by General Atomics.
India makes a supersonic cruise missile, the Brahmos, in a joint venture with Russia that both countries hope to sell to third countries, a development that would make India a significant arms exporter for the first time.
But US is likely to treat the export of armed drones to India with much more caution than it does to NATO allies . India's nuclear-capable cruise missiles could benefit from drone technology. USA is hesitant to expand India’s perceived options for striking Pakistan. 

By: Vishal