Fundamental Rights Vis-À-Vis Directive Principles

Part III and IV of the Constitution have been together described as “Conscience of the Constitution”. But the fundamental question in the context of the Constitutional relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of the State Policy is; which of these parts would have primacy in the case of conflict between them? This question has all along been the central point of controversy between parliament and Supreme Court resulting not only in the enactment of some of the significant Constitutional amendments but also in the pronouncement of some of the locus classicus judicial decisions.

THE DEBATE AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

The primary distinction between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles as visualized by the drafters of the Constitution was with regards to the question of enforceability. Part III of the Constitution was enforceable against the state but Article 37 expressly provided that Part IV was not enforceable in a court. Early Supreme Court decisions attributed paramount importance to Fundamental Rights based on this aforementioned Constitutional position and provision. In the landmark judgment of State of Madras v Srimathi Champakam that subsequently led to the 1st Constitutional Amendment, Justice Das stated that directive principles were expressly made unenforceable by Article 37 and therefore could not override the fundamental rights found in Part III, which were enforceable pursuant to Article 32. The court opined that fundamental rights were sacrosanct and could not be curtailed by Directive Principles and asserted that the directive principles although important in their own respect were required to adhere to the Fundamental Rights and in the case of conflict Part III would prevail over Part IV. This view of the apex court was reaffirmed in subsequent landmark decisions such as Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v State of Bihar and In re Kerala Education Bill, 1957 .

These decisions of the apex court were subject to much criticism due to the excess importance endorsed to Fundamental Rights resulting in the complete neglect of principles that promoted socio-economic change and development. The legislature was disappointed with the judiciary’s interpretation and believed that it was contradictory to what the framers of the Constitution believed. Pandit Nehru in his speeches in relation to the 1st and 4th Constitutional Amendments expressly stated his disappointment. He stated, “There is difficulty when the Courts of the Land have to consider these matters and lay more stress on the Fundamental Rights than on the Directive Principles. The result is that the whole purpose behind the Constitution which was meant to be a dynamic Constitution leading to a certain goal step by step, is somewhat hampered and hindered by the static element being emphasized a little more than the dynamic element.” It is therefore evident that the legislature believed that Fundamental Rights were to assist the Directive Principles and not vice-versa.

This subsequently led to a transformation in the interpretation of the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles to be more inclusive and harmonious. In Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging Bangalore v State of Mysore , the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 was challenged for conferring unrestricted, unfettered and arbitrary power on the statein determining the minimum wages. The state argued that it was obligated to provide for minimum wages in accordance with the Directive Principles. The court held that the provisions of the Constitution were created to facilitate progress, as intended by the Preamble and it would be fallacious to assume that the Constitution provided only for rights and no duties. Furthermore, it was stated that although Part III encompasses Fundamental Rights, Part IV was essential in the governance of the country and were therefore supplementary to each other. This view was reaffirmed in Kesavanda Bharati v State of Kerala where it was held that the directive principles were in harmony with the country’s aims and objectives and the fundamental rights could be amended to meet the needs of the hour implying that Parts III and IV needed to be harmoniously construed.

Although these judgments were more dynamic in comparison to the previous approach that the apex court had extended, it still did not satisfy the ideals of the legislature. It could easily be speculated that the 42nd Amendment in 1976 was to accord primacy to the Directive Principles over the Fundamental Rights. The purpose of the amendment was to make the Directive Principles comprehensive and accord them precedence over the fundamental rights ‘which have been allowed to be relied upon to frustrate socio-economic reforms for the implementing of Directive Principles’. This resulted in the resurgence of the debate on the relationship between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles.
In Minerva Mills Ltd. v Union of India , the court believed that the harmonious relation between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles was a basic feature of the Constitution. It was stated that Part III and Part IV together comprised of the core of the constitution and any legislation or amendment that destroyed the balance between the two would be in contravention to the basic structure of the Constitution. CJ. Chandrachud reasserted that Parts III and IV are complementary to each other and together they constitute the human rights of an individual. Reading these provisions independently would be impossible, as that would render them incomplete and thereby inaccessible.
However, this was not settled as law yet and there was another hiccup in the subsequent judgments. In Sanjiev Coke Mfg. Co. v M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. , the Supreme Court held that the part of the Minerva Mills judgment that dealt with Article 31 C of the Constitution was merely obiter dictumand therefore not binding. The court thus upheld the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972 by granting greater importance to Directive Principles than Fundamental Rights in accordance with Article 31C that provided for the same.
The Sanjiev Coke judgment resulted in a divergence of opinion, which was ultimately settled in State of Tamil Nadu v L. Abu Kavier Bai . The court referred to the decision of Constituent Assembly to create two parts for these core constitutional concepts. It was stated that the purpose of the two distinct chapters was to grant the Government enough latitude and flexibility to implement the principles depending on the time and circumstances. The court therefore considered the Minerva Mills case as precedent and recommended a harmonious construction of the two parts in public interest and to promote social welfare. This view has been consistently adopted ever since and has been endorsed in Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka and Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra Pradesh . It can therefore be construed to be well settled that a harmonious interpretation of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles is quintessential in ensuring social welfare and the apex court is promoting the same view after much deliberation.

By: Mona Kaushal