Need For a Proactive Nuclear Doctrine

Context:

The growing tensions across the border over the last one and a half year has raised fears of dangerous escalations that might culminate into a nuclear confrontation. Amidst the situation differing opinions have been put forward regarding the Nuclear Doctrine of India. An argument to revisit and revise the “first use policy” is gaining popularity amongst the security advisors.

Introduction:

India’s nuclear weapon status has not been successful to prevent Pakistan’s both unconventional attacks as well as conventional aggression, whereas a nuclear Pakistan has unwaveringly deterred the possible large scale Indian military retaliation in the aftermath of 1999 Kargil War, the 2001 assault on Indian Parliament and the 2008 Mumbai attacks all of which were orchestrated and executed by Pakistan’s intelligence agency ISI.

Indian response, so far, has been one of “restraint” largely because of the fear of escalation to nuclear exchange between the two nuclear powers.

Also, India has not been successful to fashion a strategy that would induce Pakistan to desist from sponsoring terrorism across the border.

Moving Towards “First Use Policy”

While maintaining a deterrent stability in South Asia; a hands-on move from New Delhi will not necessarily instigate the Pakistani leadership to cross the nuclear Rubicon.

In fact, a proactive Indian nuclear posture has the potential to prove as a catalyst to peace and stability in the sub-continent.

The reality must be accepted is that India’s deterrence capabilities will deter Pakistan only when the later will believe that the former will indeed use such weapons if there is a need.

“The most effective way to show that India was not afraid to use military force against Pakistan would be actually to use it.” The objective might not be the use of blatant military force against Pakistan. But, merely to make them understand that “about what India would be prepared to accept as an alternative to full-scale war.”

For such a stance, India might have to readjust its nuclear doctrine in favour of a first use option. A threat of first use can instil greater uncertainty and confusion in the adversary’s mind and thereby deter them from even non-nuclear provocations.

It would also allow India to respond to the enemy’s imminent nuclear use, limiting the damage to India.
It may be recalled that deterrence stability was maintained in Europe during the Cold War era only because of the United States’ policy of first use of nuclear weapons.

Viability of Limited War:

Despite a nuclear brinkmanship in South Asia, Pakistan dared to pursue a limited war in 1999 even though unsuccessfully. It raises a question “whether limited war objectives could be backed up by a doctrine of massive retaliation in South Asia?”

The Kargil crisis did have certain lessons for the Indian military planners too
(a) Indian nuclear deterrence failed to prevent a Pakistani attack
(b) it also does not necessarily explain the limited-war approach that was chosen by Pakistan.
As a result of the lessons from the Kargil war, certain military circles seem to have a general feeling that a limited war is indeed possible.
It is also believed that Pakistan’s nuclear redlines are not as low as it would like the world to believe. And therefore, limited operations are possible below Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.

Limited War on POK - Practicality and apprehensions:

One strategy that may not lead to inadvertent nuclear flare up between the two countries is a limited attack on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK). Since Pakistani rulers considered POK as “liberated” or “independent (Aazad Kashmir)”, a limited strike or a commando operation there may not be construed as an attack in their mainland; thus without threatening their territorial integrity.
Such an attack is unlikely to stop Pakistan from further interference, but as a nation, India would at least send a message to the perpetrators that there exists a limit to the nation’s forbearance. Failure to respond decisively would virtually guarantee future terrorist attacks anyway.

However, it raises apprehensions that Pakistan might escalate such a limited attack to the nuclear level.

But Pakistan’s politicomilitary leadership is astute enough to realize that any nuclear strike on India would provoke overwhelming retaliation and effectively finish Pakistan as a viable political entity.
Thus a limited strike on POK may not necessarily lead to a nuclear confrontation between the two neighbours.

Pakistanis also understand that their nuclear attack against India would not compensate for their conventional inferiority. Because, as per India’s nuclear doctrine, India is expected to go for “massive retaliation” to inflict “unacceptable damage” to Pakistan if the latter uses nuclear weapon against the former.

Geopolitical Perspective:

The nuclear deterrence posture of Pakistan when seen from a geopolitical perspective, shows that the bulk of its national assets are concentrated in a narrow north-south corridor running close to the Indian border with hardly any strategic depth of its own.

On the contrary, India’s national assets are widely distributed over a very large land-mass. So in case there is a nuclear face-off between India and Pakistan, the former (Pakistan) might come under ‘grievous harm’ where as the latter faces ‘annihilation’; “the extent of the virtually unbridgeable gap India has with respect to Pakistan.”

“Their country’s (Pakistan’s) ceasing to exist is not a prospect even the most rabid Pakistani Islamic extremists in and out of military uniform would care to risk.”

Therefore, India need not be so defensive about Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and certainly could maintain a balance in its nuclear deterrence posture vis-a-vis the nuclear neighbour.

It is also equally important to read the Pakistani minds about the situations and circumstances in which Islamabad might opt for using nuclear weapons against Indian targets.

As per a famous interview of former head of Strategic Plans Directorate, Islamabad would use nuclear option in four situations:
(a) India takes Pakistan’s territory
(b) destroys a large part of its land or air force
(c) tries to impose a naval blockade or
(d) tries to politically destabilise Pakistan and creates internal subversion.

Many high-ranking Pakistani officials and politicians have expressed similar opinions in the past. But one noteworthy aspect of these revelations sounds quite ambiguous, i.e. the amount of territory to be conquered or the quantity of forces to be depleted to reach Pakistan’s nuclear threshold.
It is argued that the use of nuclear weapon would have to be used in a step by step approach as a “weapon of last resort.”
But in a country with a history of  military coups and military interventions in Civil Government raises very serious threats. The situation will become horrific if a radicalized group of generals with a revolutionary anti-India agenda seize power and intimidate India with their nuclear weapons? Or when New Delhi receives an undeniable proof of an impending nuclear attack by ISI-supported terrorists on Indian targets?

The four times attacks by Pakistani Taliban on Kamra’s Aeronautical Complex which houses air weapons and stores a part of the country’s nuclear arsenal has already raised the specter of the terrorists getting control of the country’s atomic weapons. Such a situation might compel New Delhi to review its “no First Use policy”.

Conclusion
Thus, India needs a proactive nuclear posture to deter Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail and state-sponsored terrorism, and the country must be looking geared up to breach the present nuclear barrier of Pakistan.
Air strikes on non-urban targets, air strikes or even commando operations against terrorist hideouts in POK as part of limited war can be waged under the nuclear threshold.
Henry Kissinger, as a cold war nuclear deterrent strategist wrote, “A deterrent which one is afraid to implement when it is challenged ceases to be a deterrent.”

The 2016 “Operation Shatrujeet”, a military exercise of Indian army in Thar Desert aimed at sharpening the previous “Cold Start” is a move in right direction.
It seeks to validate the capability of the Army to “First generate and then maintain” intense offensive manouvres backed by long-range artillery and the Air Force including airborne operations and paradropping of thousands of soldiers behind ‘enemy’ lines.

Such military exercises may not constitute a direct answer to the existing nuclear deterrent, it certainly sends a message that the country is indeed ready to move even under the nuclear threshold. After all, being prepared for the war is the biggest deterrent for war.

By: Chandan Sharma